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eLibrary >
BS EN IEC 63208:2025 - TC Tracked Changes. Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear and their assemblies. Security requirements >
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BS EN IEC 63208:2025 - TC Tracked Changes. Low-voltage switchgear and controlgear and their assemblies. Security requirements, 2025
- A-30484650.pdf [Go to Page]
- undefined
- European foreword
- Endorsement notice
- Annex ZA (normative) Normative references to international publications with their corresponding European publications [Go to Page]
- CONTENTS
- FOREWORD
- INTRODUCTION
- Figures [Go to Page]
- Figure 1 – Standard landscape
- 1 Scope
- 2 Normative references
- 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms [Go to Page]
- 3.1 Terms and definitions
- 3.2 Abbreviated terms
- 4 General
- 5 Security objectives
- 6 Security lifecycle management [Go to Page]
- 6.1 General
- Tables [Go to Page]
- Table 1 – Potential attack levels
- Table 2 – Typical threats
- 6.2 Security risk assessment [Go to Page]
- 6.2.1 General
- Figure 2 – Example of physical interfaces of an embedded device in an equipment which can be subject to an attack [Go to Page]
- 6.2.2 Relationship between safety and security
- Figure 3 – Example of relation between security and safety [Go to Page]
- 6.2.3 Impact assessment
- 6.2.4 Security risk assessment result
- 6.3 Response to security risk
- Table 3 – Impact evaluation
- 6.4 Security requirement specification
- 6.5 Roles and responsibilities
- Table 4 – Roles related to security responsibilities
- 6.6 Important data
- 6.7 Control system architecture [Go to Page]
- 6.7.1 Control system
- 6.7.2 Levels of communication functionalities
- Figure 4 – Control system architecture with switchgear and controlgear [Go to Page]
- 6.7.3 Levels of connectivity
- Figure 5 – Control system connectivity level C1
- Figure 6 – Control system connectivity level C2
- Figure 7 – Control system connectivity level C3
- Figure 8 – Control system connectivity level C4
- Figure 9 – Control system connectivity level C5 [Go to Page]
- 6.7.4 Exposure levels of equipment
- 6.7.5 Equipment security levels
- Table 5 – Level of exposure of an equipment [Go to Page]
- 6.7.6 Security protection profile
- Figure 10 – Structure of a security protection profile
- Table 6 – Equipment security level
- 7 Security requirements [Go to Page]
- 7.1 General
- 7.2 Physical access and environment [Go to Page]
- 7.2.1 PA – Physical access and environment requirement
- 7.2.2 Physical access and environment rationale
- 7.2.3 PA-e – Physical access and environment enhancement
- Table 7 – Physical access related requirement references
- Table 8 – Physical access enhancement related requirement references [Go to Page]
- 7.2.4 Physical access and environment typical implementation
- 7.3 Equipment requirement [Go to Page]
- 7.3.1 General
- 7.3.2 FR 1 – Identification and authentication control
- 7.3.3 FR 2 – Use control
- 7.3.4 FR 3 – System integrity
- 7.3.5 FR 4 – Data confidentiality
- 7.3.6 FR 5 – Restricted data flow
- 7.3.7 FR 6 – Timely response to events
- 7.3.8 FR 7 – Resource availability
- 8 Instructions for installation, operation and maintenance [Go to Page]
- 8.1 User instruction requirement
- 8.2 User instruction enhancement
- 8.3 User instruction implementation
- Figure 11 – Example of security instruction symbol
- 9 Conformance verification and testing [Go to Page]
- 9.1 General
- 9.2 Design documentation
- 9.3 Physical access [Go to Page]
- 9.3.1 Verification of physical access and environment
- 9.3.2 Verdict criterion
- 9.3.3 Physical access and environment enhancement
- 9.3.4 Verdict criterion
- 9.4 FR 1 – Identification and authentication control [Go to Page]
- 9.4.1 CR 1.1 – Human user identification and authentication
- 9.4.2 CR 1.2 – Software and equipment identification and authentication
- 9.4.3 CR 1.5 – Authenticator management
- 9.4.4 CR 1.7 – Strength of password-based authentication
- 9.4.5 CR 1.8 – Public key infrastructure certificates
- 9.4.6 CR 1.9 – Strength of public key-based authentication
- 9.4.7 CR 1.10 – Authenticator feedback
- 9.4.8 CR 1.11 – Unsuccessful login attempts
- 9.4.9 CR 1.14 – Strength of symmetric key-based authentication
- 9.5 FR 2 – Use control [Go to Page]
- 9.5.1 CR 2.1 – Authorisation enforcement
- 9.5.2 CR 2.2 – Wireless use control
- 9.5.3 EDR 2.4 – Mobile code
- 9.5.4 CR 2.5 – Session lock
- 9.5.5 CR 2.6 – Remote session termination
- 9.5.6 CR 2.7 – Concurrent session control
- 9.5.7 CR 2.8 – Auditable events
- 9.5.8 CR 2.9 – Audit storage capacity
- 9.5.9 CR 2.10 – Response to audit processing failures
- 9.5.10 CR 2.11 – Timestamps
- 9.5.11 CR 2.12 – Non-repudiation
- 9.5.12 EDR 2.13 – Use of physical diagnostic and test interfaces
- 9.6 FR 3 – System integrity [Go to Page]
- 9.6.1 CR 3.1 – Communication integrity
- 9.6.2 EDR 3.2 – Protection from malicious code
- 9.6.3 CR 3.3 – Security functionality verification
- 9.6.4 CR 3.4 – Software and information integrity
- 9.6.5 CR 3.5 – Input validation
- 9.6.6 CR 3.6 – Deterministic output
- 9.6.7 CR 3.7 – Error handling
- 9.6.8 CR 3.8 – Session Integrity
- 9.6.9 CR 3.9 – Protection of audit information
- 9.6.10 EDR 3.10 – Support for updates
- 9.6.11 EDR 3.11 – Physical tamper resistance and detection
- 9.6.12 EDR 3.12 – Provisioning product supplier roots of trust
- 9.6.13 EDR 3.13 – Provisioning asset owner roots of trust
- 9.6.14 EDR 3.14 – Integrity of the boot process
- 9.7 FR 4 – Data confidentiality [Go to Page]
- 9.7.1 CR 4.1 – Information confidentiality
- 9.7.2 CR 4.3 – Use of cryptography
- 9.8 FR 6 – Timely response to events [Go to Page]
- 9.8.1 CR 6.1 – Audit log accessibility
- 9.9 FR 7 – Resource availability [Go to Page]
- 9.9.1 CR 7.1 – Denial of service protection
- 9.9.2 CR 7.2 – Resource management
- 9.9.3 CR 7.3 – Control system backup
- 9.9.4 CR 7.4 – Control system recovery and reconstitution
- 9.9.5 CR 7.6 – Network and security configuration settings
- 9.9.6 CR 7.7 – Least functionality
- 9.9.7 CR 7.8 – Control system inventory
- Annex A (informative) Cybersecurity and electrical system architecture [Go to Page]
- A.1 General
- A.2 Typical architecture involving switchgear, controlgear and their assembly [Go to Page]
- A.2.1 Building
- A.2.2 Manufacturing
- Figure A.1 – Building electrical architecture
- Figure A.2 – Industrial plants
- Annex B (informative) Use case studies [Go to Page]
- B.1 General
- Table B.1 – List of actors
- Table B.2 – Base line requirement
- Table B.3 – Security problems of use cases
- B.2 Use case 1 – Protection against Denial of Service (DoS) attack
- B.3 Use case 2 – Protection against unauthorised modification of sensing device
- B.4 Use case 3 – Protection against unauthorised modification of wireless equipment
- B.5 Use case 4 – Protection against threat actor remotely taking control of a "managing" intelligent assembly
- Annex C (informative) Development methods of cybersecurity measures
- Annex D (informative) Security related instructions in the product documentation [Go to Page]
- D.1 General
- D.2 Risk assessment and security planning [Go to Page]
- D.2.1 Risk assessment
- D.2.2 Security plan
- D.3 Recommendations for design and installation of the system integrating switchgear, controlgear and their assemblies [Go to Page]
- D.3.1 General access control
- D.3.2 Recommendations for local access
- D.3.3 Recommendations for remote access
- D.3.4 Recommendations for firmware upgrades
- D.3.5 Recommendations for the end of life
- D.4 Instructions for an assembly
- Annex E (normative) Security protection profile of soft-starter and semiconductor controller [Go to Page]
- E.1 Introduction [Go to Page]
- E.1.1 Security protection profile reference
- E.1.2 Target of evaluation overview
- Figure E.1 – Machinery control architecture [Go to Page]
- E.1.3 General mission objectives
- E.1.4 Features
- E.1.5 Product usage
- E.1.6 Users
- E.2 Assumptions
- E.3 Conformance claims and conformance statement
- E.4 Security problem definition [Go to Page]
- E.4.1 Critical assets of the environment
- Table E.1 – Security requirements for the critical assets of the environment [Go to Page]
- E.4.2 ToE critical assets
- E.4.3 Threat modelFR 7 – Resource availability
- Table E.2 – Security requirements for the critical assets
- E.5 Security objectives
- E.6 Security requirements [Go to Page]
- E.6.1 Security functional requirements
- E.6.2 Security assurance requirements
- Table E.3 – Security functional requirements
- Annex F (normative) Security protection profile of network connected motor starter [Go to Page]
- F.1 Introduction [Go to Page]
- F.1.1 Security protection profile reference
- F.1.2 Target of evaluation overview
- Figure F.1 – Machinery control architecture [Go to Page]
- F.1.3 General mission objectives
- F.1.4 Features
- F.1.5 Product usage
- F.1.6 Users
- F.2 Assumptions
- F.3 Conformance claims and conformance statement
- F.4 Security problem definition [Go to Page]
- F.4.1 Critical assets of the environment
- F.4.2 ToE critical assets
- F.4.3 Threat model
- Table F.1 – Security requirements for the critical assets of the environment
- Table F.2 – Security requirements for the critical assets
- F.5 Security objectives
- F.6 Security requirements [Go to Page]
- F.6.1 Security functional requirements
- F.6.2 Security assurance requirements
- Table F.3 – Security functional requirements
- Annex G (normative) Security protection profile of circuit-breaker [Go to Page]
- G.1 Introduction [Go to Page]
- G.1.1 Security protection profile reference
- G.1.2 Target of evaluation overview
- Figure G.1 – Circuit-breaker in its environment [Go to Page]
- G.1.3 General mission objectives
- G.1.4 Features
- G.1.5 Product usage
- G.1.6 Users
- G.2 Assumptions
- G.3 Conformance claims and conformance statement
- G.4 Security problem definition [Go to Page]
- G.4.1 Critical assets of the environment
- G.4.2 ToE critical assets
- G.4.3 Threat model
- Table G.1 – Security requirements for the critical assets of the environment
- Table G.2 – Security requirements for the critical assets
- G.5 Security objectives
- G.6 Security requirements [Go to Page]
- G.6.1 Security functional requirements
- G.6.2 Security assurance requirements
- Table G.3 – Security functional requirements
- Annex H (normative) Security protection profile of transfer switch equipment [Go to Page]
- H.1 Introduction [Go to Page]
- H.1.1 Security protection profile reference
- H.1.2 Target of evaluation overview
- Figure H.1 – Functional units of the transfer switch equipment [Go to Page]
- H.1.3 General mission objectives
- H.1.4 Features
- H.1.5 Product usage
- H.1.6 Users
- H.2 Assumptions
- H.3 Conformance claims and conformance statement
- H.4 Security problem definition [Go to Page]
- H.4.1 Critical assets of the environment
- H.4.2 ToE critical assets
- H.4.3 Threat model
- Table H.1 – Security requirements for the critical assets of the environment
- Table H.2 – Security requirements for the critical assets
- H.5 Security objectives
- H.6 Security requirements [Go to Page]
- H.6.1 Security functional requirements
- Table H.3 – Security functional requirements [Go to Page]
- H.6.2 Security assurance requirements
- Annex I (normative) Security protection profile for wireless controlgearwith its communication interface [Go to Page]
- I.1 Introduction [Go to Page]
- I.1.1 Security protection profile reference
- I.1.2 Target of evaluation overview
- Figure I.1 – Machinery control architecture [Go to Page]
- I.1.3 General mission objectives
- I.1.4 Features
- I.1.5 Product usage
- I.1.6 Users
- I.2 Assumptions
- I.3 Conformance claims and conformance statement
- I.4 Security problem definition [Go to Page]
- I.4.1 Critical assets of the environment
- I.4.2 ToE critical assets
- Table I.1 – Security requirements for the critical assets of the environment [Go to Page]
- I.4.3 Threat model
- I.5 Security objectives
- Table I.2 – Security requirements for the critical assets
- I.6 Security requirements [Go to Page]
- I.6.1 Security functional requirements
- I.6.2 Security assurance requirements
- Table I.3 – Security functional requirements
- Annex J (informative) Equipment requirements by level of exposure [Go to Page]
- Table J.1 – Equipment requirements by level of exposure
- Annex K (informative) Bridging references to cybersecurity management systems [Go to Page]
- Table K.1 – Useful security standards
- Table K.2 – Contribution of switchgear, controlgear and their assemblies to ISO and IEC horizontal security framework
- Table K.3 – Mapping to other security framework
- Table K.4 – Requirements for IACS not relevant for switchgear, controlgear and their assemblies
- Table K.5 – Requirements for IoT device not relevant for switchgear, controlgear and their assemblies
- Annex L (informative) Mapping of provisions to the essential cybersecurity requirements of the European Cyber Resilient Act Annexes [Go to Page]
- Table L.1 – Mapping to the essential cybersecurity requirements of the CRA Annex I
- Bibliography [Go to Page]
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