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BS EN ISO 13849-2:2012 - TC Tracked Changes. Safety of machinery. Safety-related parts of control systems - Validation, 2019
- BS EN ISO 13849-2:2008 [Go to Page]
- EUROPEAN STANDARD NORME EUROPÉENNE EUROPÄISCHE NORM
- Foreword [Go to Page]
- Table 1 — Structure of the clauses of annexesAnnexes A to D of this part of ISO 13849
- Introduction [Go to Page]
- INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO 13849-2:200312(E)
- 1 Scope
- 2 Normative references
- 3 Terms and definitions
- 34 Validation process [Go to Page]
- 34.1 Validation principles [Go to Page]
- Figure 1 — Overview of the validation process
- 3.4.2 Validation plan
- 3.24.3 Generic fault lists
- 3.34.4 Specific fault lists
- a) the faults taken from the generic list(s) to be included,
- b) any other relevant faults to be included but not given in the generic list (e.g. common mode faults);-cause failures),
- c) the faults taken from the generic list(s) which may be excluded and can meet at leaston the basis that the criteria given in the generic list(s) [(see EN 954-1:1996 (ISO 13849-1:1999),2006, 7.2];3) are satisfied, and
- and, exceptionally [Go to Page]
- 34.5 Information for validation [Go to Page]
- Table 2 — Documentation requirements for categories in respect of performance levels
- 34.6 Validation record
- 45 Validation by analysis [Go to Page]
- 45.2 Analysis techniques
- 56 Validation by testing [Go to Page]
- 5.6.1 General
- 56.2 Measurement uncertaintyaccuracy
- 56.3 HigherMore stringent requirements
- 56.4 Number of test samples
- 67 Validation of safety requirements specification for safety functions
- 8 Validation of safety functions
- 79 Validation of performance levels and categories [Go to Page]
- 79.1 Analysis and testing of categories
- 79.2 Validation of category specifications [Go to Page]
- 79.2.1 Category B
- 79.2.2 Category 1
- 79.2.3 Category 2
- NOTE 2 In particular cases, higher values of MTTFd and/or DCavg can be required — for example, owing to high PLr. [Go to Page]
- 79.2.4 Category 3
- 79.2.5 Category 4
- 9.3 Validation of MTTFd, DCavg and CCF
- 9.4 Validation of measures against systematic failures related to performance level and category of SRP/CS
- 9.5 Validation of safety-related software
- As a first step, check that there is documentation for the specification and design of the safety-related software. This documentation shall be reviewed for completeness and absence of erroneous interpretations, omissions or inconsistencies. [Go to Page]
- 9.6 Validation and verification of performance level
- 7.39.7 Validation of combination of safety-related parts
- 810 Validation of environmental requirements
- 911 Validation of maintenance requirements
- 12 Validation of technical documentation and information for use
- (informative) [Go to Page]
- Table A.1 — Basic safety principles
- A.3 List of well-tried safety principles
- Table A.2 — Well-tried safety principles [Go to Page]
- A.4 List of well–tried components
- Table A.3 — Well–tried components [Go to Page]
- Table A.4 — Mechanical devices, components and elements (e.g. cam, follower, chain, clutch, brake, shaft, screw, pin, guide, bearing)
- Validation tools for pneumatic systems [Go to Page]
- Table B.1 — Basic safety principles
- Table B.2 — Well-tried safety principles
- Table B.3 — Faults and fault exclusions — Directional control valves
- Table B.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Stop (shut-off) valves/non-return (check) valves/quick-action venting valves/shuttle valves, etc.
- Table B.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Flow valves
- Table B.7 — Faults and fault exclusions — Pipework
- Table B.9 — Faults and fault exclusions — Connectors
- Table B.16 — Faults and fault exclusions — Information processing — Logical elements
- Annex C [Go to Page]
- (informative) [Go to Page]
- Validation tools for hydraulic systems [Go to Page]
- Table C.1 — Basic safety principles
- Table C.2 — Well-tried safety principles
- Table C.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Stop (shut–off) valves/non-return (check) valves/shuttle valves, etc.
- Table C.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Flow valves
- Table C.6 — Faults and fault exclusions — Pressure valves
- Annex D [Go to Page]
- (informative) [Go to Page]
- Table D.1 — Basic safety principles
- Table D.2 — Well-tried safety principles
- Table D.3 — Well–tried components
- D.2 Fault exclusion [Go to Page]
- D.2.1 General
- D.2.2 “Tin whiskers”
- D.2.3 Short circuits on PCB-mounted parts
- D.2.4 Fault exclusions and integrated circuits [Go to Page]
- Table D.4 — Faults and fault exclusions — Conductors/cables
- Table D.5 — Faults and fault exclusions — Printed circuits boards/assemblies
- Table D.7 — Faults and fault exclusions — Multi–pin connector
- Table D.8 — Faults and fault exclusions — Switches — Electromechanical position switches, manually operated switches (e.g. push-button, reset actuator, DIP switch, magnetically operated contacts, reed switch, pressure switch, temperature switch) [Go to Page]
- Table D.9 — Faults and fault exclusions — Switches — Electromechanical devices
- Table D.14 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Resistors
- Table D.15 — Faults and fault exclusions — Discrete electrical components — Resistor networks
- Table D.20 — Faults and fault exclusions — Electronic components — Non–programmable integrated circuits
- E.1 General
- E.2 Description of machine [Go to Page]
- Figure E.1 — Machine used in example: automatic assembly machine
- Table E.1 — Active safety functions according to mode of operation
- Figure E.2 — Automatic assembly machine — Electrical circuit diagram
- Table E.2 — Attributes of components implementing SRP/CS (parts list of Figures E.2 and E.3)
- E.4.2 Safety function SF 1 — Safety-related stopping initiated by the opening of the interlocking guard and prevention of unexpected start-up whenever the interlocking guard is open [Go to Page]
- Figure E.4 — Function blocks — SF 1.0, SF 1.1, SF 1.2 and SF 1.3
- a) Identification of safety-related parts
- Figure E.5 — Safety-related block diagram — SF 1.0
- Figure E.6 — Safety-related block diagram — SF 1.1, SF 1.2 and SF 1.3
- Figure E.7 — Combination of SRP/CS performing safety functions
- b) Estimation of MTTFd of each channel
- c) Estimation of DCavg
- d) Estimation of measures against common-cause failure (CCF)
- e) Determination of PL for each SRP/CS
- f) Determination of the PL for the combination of SRP/CS performing SF 1.0, SF 1.1, SF 1.2 and SF 1.3
- g) Systematic failures
- E.4.3 Safety function SF 2 — Safely-limited speed (SLS) [Go to Page]
- a) Identification of safety-related parts
- Figure E.8 — Safety-related block diagram — SF 2
- Figure E.9 — SRP/CS performing the safety function SF 2
- b) Estimation of MTTFd of each channel
- c) Estimation of DCavg
- d) Estimation of measures against common-cause failure (CCF)
- e) Determination of the PL for the SRP/CS
- f) Systematic failures
- E.4.4 Safety function SF 3 — Hold-to-run mode [Go to Page]
- a) Identification of safety-related parts
- Figure E.10 — Safety-related block diagram — SF 3
- Figure E.11 — Combination of SRP/CS performing the safety function SF 3
- b) Estimation of MTTFd of each channel
- c) Estimation of DCavg
- d) Estimation of measures against common-cause failure (CCF)
- e) Determination of PL for each SRP/CS
- f) Determination of the PL of the combination of SRP/CS performing SF 3
- g) Systematic failures
- E.5 Validation [Go to Page]
- E.5.1 General
- E.5.2 Validation of fault behaviour and DCavg
- E.5.3 FMEA and DCavg for SF 1.0 and SF 1.3 [Go to Page]
- E.5.3.1 SF 1.0
- Figure E.12 — Safety-related block diagram — SF 1.0
- Table E.3 — FMEA and estimation of DC for components of SRP/CSI of SF 1.0
- Table E.4 — FMEA and estimation of DC of components for SRP/CSL/O of SF 1.0
- E.5.3.2 SF 1.3
- Figure E.13 — Safety-related block diagram for SF 1.3
- Table E.5 — FMEA of SRP/CSL/O of SF 1.3
- Bibliography
- 30198893.pdf [Go to Page]
- CVP_Secretariat_Loca
- Annex E
(informative)
Example of validation of fault behaviour and diagnostic means
- Bibliography
- Foreword
- Introduction
- 1 Scope
- 2 Normative references
- 3 Terms and definitions
- 4 Validation process
- 4.1 Validation principles
- 4.2 Validation plan
- 4.3 Generic fault lists
- 4.4 Specific fault lists
- 4.5 Information for validation
- 4.6 Validation record
- 5 Validation by analysis
- 5.1 General
- 5.2 Analysis techniques
- 6 Validation by testing
- 6.1 General
- 6.2 Measurement accuracy
- 6.3 More stringent requirements
- 6.4 Number of test samples
- 7 Validation of safety requirements specification for safety functions
- 8 Validation of safety functions
- 9 Validation of performance levels and categories
- 9.1 Analysis and testing
- 9.2 Validation of category specifications
- 9.3 Validation of MTTFd, DCavg and CCF
- 9.4 Validation of measures against systematic failures related to performance level and category of SRP/CS
- 9.5 Validation of safety-related software
- 9.6 Validation and verification of performance level
- 9.7 Validation of combination of safety-related parts
- 10 Validation of environmental requirements
- 11 Validation of maintenance requirements
- 12 Validation of technical documentation and information for use
- Annex A
(informative)
Validation tools for mechanical systems
- Annex B
(informative)
Validation tools for pneumatic systems
- Annex C
(informative)
Validation tools for hydraulic systems
- Annex D
(informative)
Validation tools for electrical systems
- Annex E
(informative)
Example of validation of fault behaviour and diagnostic means
- Bibliography [Go to Page]
